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Robert Samuelson, a business and economics journalist, cautions: 
“[W]e don’t know enough to relieve global warming, and . . . we 
can’t do much about it.”1  He cites the International Energy Agency 
for the notion that unless we freeze everyone’s consumption, 
including that of the global poor, greenhouse emissions will double 
by 2050.2  James Fleming adds that the pursuit of technological or 
Rube Goldberg quick fixes to global warming by American and other 
experts raises doubts about the prospect of achieving the international 
cooperation and lifestyle changes required by more conventional 
approaches, such as carbon taxes, alternative energy sources, and 
other measures aimed at increasing energy efficiency.3  One well-
financed quick fix, nuclear power, threatens disasters that would 
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1 Robert J. Samuelson, Editorial, Global Warming’s Real Inconvenient Truth, WASH. 
POST, July 5, 2006, at A13. 
2 Id. 
3 James R. Fleming, The Climate Engineers, WILSON Q., Spring 2007, at 46, 48. 
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overwhelm even the risks of global warming.  Having been rudely 
awakened to the demonstrable realities of climate change,4 many 
policymakers are pessimistic about the ability of human civilization to 
cope.  This is sad news for the poorest and most powerless citizens of 
developing countries and cities, including those of the rather 
underdeveloped New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, who will bear 
the brunt of the disasters and diminished opportunities associated with 
climate change. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes 
an “increasing . . . risk of storms, flooding, landslides, heatwaves and 
drought and [an] overloading [of] water, drainage and energy supply 
systems.”5  Up to 160,000 deaths per year are attributed to the effects 
 
4 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], Summary for 
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1 passim (Susan 
Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ 
ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary 
for Policymakers is definitive in its support for the global warming/climate change 
paradigm, observing: “The understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling 
influences on climate has improved since the [Third Assessment Report], leading to 
[ninety percent] confidence that the global average net effect of human activities since 
1750 has been one of warming.”  Id. at 3 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).  Further, 
“[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and 
ice, and rising global average sea level.”  Id. at 5 (citation omitted).  See Naomi Oreskes, 
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686, 1686 (2004).  Oreskes’ meta-
analysis surveyed 928 papers on climate change and found that “none of the papers 
disagreed with the consensus position” that human activity is the major cause of global 
warming.  Id.; see also U.S. EPA, Climate Change, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (compiling data, statistics, reports, and other 
information concerning global warming).  But see Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, 
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 12, 14 (“The press and television, despite an 
overwhelming scientific consensus concerning global warming, give equal time to fringe 
‘contrarians’ supported by the fossil fuel industry.  Special interest groups mount effective 
disinformation campaigns to sow doubt about the reality of global warming. . . . The 
public is understandably confused or uninterested.  I used to spread the blame uniformly 
until, when I was about to appear on public television, the producer informed me that the 
program ‘must’ also include a ‘contrarian’ who would take issue with claims of global 
warming.  Presenting such a view, he told me, was a common practice in commercial 
television as well as radio and newspapers.  Supporters of public TV or advertisers, with 
their own special interests, require ‘balance’ as a price for their continued financial 
support.”). 
5 IPCC, Industry, Settlement and Society, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 357, 382 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter7.pdf.  Heat waves are 
exacerbated by “heat islands”—the most built-up, centralized locations of a city.  Saleemul 
Huq et al., Editorial, Reducing Risks to Cities from Disasters and Climate Change, 19 
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 3, 5 (2007). 
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of global warming, and most of these impacts are felt in the 
developing world.6  Common increases in diseases due to climate 
change include diarrhea, from floods that overload poor sanitary 
arrangements; cardio-respiratory ailments, from pollutants interacting 
with hotter temperatures in a low-level ozone; and increases in 
tropical diseases like malaria and dengue fever, which are now 
invading areas that were previously too cool to incubate them.7  
Effects are the greatest on vulnerable populations in urban areas.8  De 
Sherbinin et al. give us a model of “multiple, synergistic stresses and 
perturbations” combining with “multiple, interacting physical and 
social characteristics of the exposed human-environment system.”9  In 
other words, there are “few easy prescriptions,”10 although the poor 
and powerless typically prove to be remarkably resilient when their 
local governance and community organizations are competent.11  
Competence turns out to be a demanding criterion, however, as 
illustrated by the unnecessary deaths from the Chicago heat wave in 
1995, the European heat waves in 2003, and Hurricane Katrina in 
2005.12 
I 
A POLICY AGENDA 
Author Brietzke is familiar with some cities in the developing 
world, including two cities from each of the continents of the South: 
Caracas, Venezuela and Rio de Janeiro (Rio), Brazil; Cairo, Egypt 
 
6 Shaoni Bhattacharya, Global Warming ‘Kills 160,000 a Year,’ NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 
1, 2003, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4223-global-warming-kills-160000-a-year 
.html. 
7 DAVID SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN URBAN AREAS: 
THE POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME NATIONS 3, 28–29 
(2007), available at http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/10549IIED.pdf. 
8 Sari Kovats & Andrew Haines, The Potential Health Impacts of Climate Change: An 
Overview, 11 MED. & WAR 168, 169 (1995). 
9 Alex de Sherbinin et al., The Vulnerability of Global Cities to Climate Hazards, 19 
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 39, 61 (2007). 
10 Id. 
11 See id.; SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 50–68; Huq et al., supra note 5, at 
3–4. 
12 See Bettina Menne, Extreme Weather Events: What Can We Do to Prevent Health 
Impacts?, in EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSES 265, 265 
(Wilhelm Kirch et al. eds., 2005); Jan C. Semenza et al., Heat-Related Deaths During the 
July 1995 Heat Wave in Chicago, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 84, 84 (1996); Editorial, Saga of 
Incompetence, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2005, at A38. 
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and Nairobi, Kenya; and Jakarta, Indonesia and Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia.  In 1999, flooding and landslides killed 30,000 and affected 
600,000 in Caracas.  Serious flooding also occurred in Jakarta in 
2007.13  Caracas, Rio, and Jakarta are all coastal cities and are thus 
vulnerable to rising sea levels.14 
Before 1999, Caracas began using an innovative, risk-based means 
of land settlement and resettlement.15  Rio is relatively fortunate to 
have federal revenues guaranteed by the Constitution; the other cities 
make do with a small part of the four to five percent of national 
revenues that are apportioned to urban areas.16  Studies of other cities 
are often instructive and transplantable if they are carefully modified: 
balancing growth, equity, and sustainability in a Cape Town 
“ecovillage”;17 achieving a sustainable infrastructure planning in Cape 
Town;18 improving the slums of Phnom Penh, Cambodia;19 public 
participation in environmental management projects within a low-
income settlement in Chiang Mai, Thailand;20 and phasing the transfer 
of health services from an international nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) to a partnership between a local government and 
a local NGO in Nepal.21  All of these studies emphasize the political 
and administrative obstacles that will figure prominently in this 
analysis. 
Climate hazards combine in ways that are unique for each city, but 
similarities are often stressed here as more amenable to overall policy 
 
13 Huq et al., supra note 5, at 6. 
14 Alex de Sherbinin et al., supra note 9, at 60–61. 
15 Virginia Jimenez Diaz, Landslides in the Squatter Settlements of Caracas; Towards a 
Better Understanding of Causative Factors, ENV’T & URBANIZATION, Oct. 1992, at 80, 
84; see SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 65. 
16 SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 75. 
17 Mark Swilling, Sustainability and Infrastructure Planning in South Africa: A Cape 
Town Case Study, 18 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 23, 40 (2006). 
18 Mark Swilling & Eve Annecke, Building Sustainable Neighbourhoods in South 
Africa:  Learning from the Lynedoch Case, 18 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 315, 316 (2006). 
19 Geoffrey Payne, Getting Ahead of the Game: A Twin-Track Approach to Improving 
Existing Slums and Reducing the Need for Future Slums, ENV’T & URBANIZATION, Apr. 
2005, at 135, 139–44. 
20 Gustavo Ribeiro & Angunthip Srisuwan, Urban Development Discourses, 
Environmental Management and Public Participation: The Case of the Mae Kha Canal in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, ENV’T & URBANIZATION, Apr. 2005, at 171, 171–82. 
21 Martin Allaby & Christine Preston, Transferring Responsibility from an 
International NGO to Local Government: Experience from the Yala Urban Health 
Programme, Nepal, ENV’T & URBANIZATION, Apr. 2005, at 249, 252. 
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analyses and conclusions.22  Each city has a gleaming, high-rise 
commercial center—a heat island—which, except in Cairo and 
perhaps Rio, is smaller in relation to the city’s total surface area 
compared to those in the West.  Each city also has spacious, elite 
residential areas where the success of residents who are foreigners or 
ethnic minorities stirs resentment among the poor, thus creating 
occasional disorders.  With the partial exception of Kuala Lumpur, 
these cities have huge residential areas occupied by poor and 
powerless people, many of whom are recent migrants from rural areas 
seeking work, as well as an emerging, better-educated middle class 
that cannot afford elite residences.  This group lives in barrios, 
favellas, townships, alleys, or kampongs.  Each of these are lacking in 
urban infrastructures such as roads; electricity and power plants; 
sewage; water plants; schools; medical care and hospitals; transport 
and communications; culturally and religiously important structures; 
responses to emergencies; financial services; supplementary care for 
the very young and elderly; social safety nets; and bureaucratic 
competence and, often, honesty.  Such infrastructures range from 
grossly overstretched (e.g., decaying colonial-era facilities and 
administrative structures) to virtually nonexistent.  All of this 
exacerbates extreme-weather events, such as sewage-laden flooding 
during increasingly common monsoons.23 
Many opponents of projects aimed at mitigation of, or adaptation 
to, climate change argue that such projects take attention and 
resources away from immediate development needs.  This line of 
thought is debunked by Lecocq and Shalizi, who examine theoretical 
and empirical studies of economic growth, rather than development, 
from the standpoint of climate change, mitigation evaluation, 
adaptation before and after a disaster, and the ultimate damage 
caused.24  They found significant reductions in both short-term and 
 
22 See Alex de Sherbinin et al., supra note 9, at 61. 
23 See PIYA ABEYGUNAWARDENA ET AL., POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POOR THROUGH ADAPTATION 4–6 (Frank 
Sperling & Heather Budge-Reid eds., 2003), available at http://www.energy 
andenvironment.undp.org/undp/indexAction.cfm?module=Library&action=GetFile&Docu
mentAttachmentID=1033. 
24 Franck Lecocq & Zmarak Shalizi, How Might Climate Change Affect Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries?: A Review of the Growth Literature with a Climate Lens 
3 (World Bank Dev. Research Group Sustainable Rural & Urban Dev. Team, Working 
Paper No. 4315, 2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/08/13/000158349_20070813145822/Rendered/PDF/ 
wps4315.pdf. 
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long-term resources due to the destruction or reduced productivity of 
production factors, including human labor and other resources to the 
introduction of economic rigidities.25  Other reductions in growth 
occur due to forced technological changes, national and local poverty 
traps, and “lock-ins.”26  Lecocq and Shalizi also found that 
preemptive or preventive mitigations and adaptations are cheaper and 
less concentrated than adaptations after the fact, especially given the 
possibility of good lock-ins.27  The difference between growth and 
development, increasingly called sustainable development, is the 
varying degrees of attention paid to improving the lot of the poor and 
powerless through development.  A rising tide does not lift all boats 
in developing countries any more than it does or did in the United 
States, for example.  Changes in climate thus reduce development 
rates to a greater extent than they reduce growth rates. 
A committee of the IPCC found a “high correlation” between 
development and adaptive capacities, a correlation resulting, only in 
part, from markets.28  The net costs of climate change, some of which 
are not yet monetized, will grow over time and vary widely across 
sectors and localities.  Others found correlations among an 
interrelated development and resilience, reduced vulnerability, and 
increased opportunities—qualities also associated with actions against 
climate change.29  The first item on the climate change policy agenda 
is: “Start with what you have, build on what you know.”30  It is not 
too cynical to label the same project either developmental or climate 
change mitigating, or both, depending on an aid donor’s preferences.  
This is a superior alternative to the moral hazard of waiting until after 
a climate change disaster for the international relief community to bail 
 
25 Id. at 37–38. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  Lecocq and Shalizi go on to argue that “lock-ins”—strong commitments to doing 
certain things in certain ways—and other channels by which climate change affects growth 
are poorly understood.  Id. at 38.  In contrast to practices in most of contemporary 
economics, growth must be evaluated in the presence of climate change as “path 
dependant with multiple equilibria.”  Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted).  Existing economic 
models can be significantly improved by focusing on the indirect effects of the energy and 
climate-sensitive sectors on the rest of the economy.  Id. 
28 IPCC, Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 811, 827 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter20 
.pdf. 
29 See, e.g., SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 9–11. 
30 Id. at 50. 
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nations out.  Indeed, new literature on risk accumulation processes 
shows the need to shift attention away from disasters.  The urban poor 
spend their lives adapting to often meager economic opportunities, 
political circumstances, risks to their homes such as crime, and a 
paucity of community organizations to act as buffers.31  In order to 
understand constraints on autonomous adaptations by the poor, it is 
necessary to first try to understand their segregation by adopting a 
pro-poor-and-powerless attitude; this is the second policy agenda 
item, which is perhaps implicit in the first.  The segregation of such 
people involves a lack of information that is not intensely local, a lack 
of public participation, and a lack of authority to organize.  Poverty is 
difficult to understand because data on household income and the cost 
of non-food necessities in the informal (i.e., unlicensed or black 
market) sector is usually unavailable.  Instead, proxies are used: 
malnutrition; infant mortality; housing quality; personal security, 
which is a particularly vexing problem in Caracas, Rio, and Nairobi; 
and the life chances of women and the elderly.32 
Each vulnerability, such as poverty (ten percent of which the 
World Bank ascribes to climate change) and powerlessness, 
reinforces other natural and man-made vulnerabilities.  These include: 
unequal access to resources, including information and technology; 
food insecurity; poor disaster management; poor land cover and use; 
incompetent governance and administration; malnutrition; insecure 
residential status; weak civil society supports; and deteriorating public 
safety.33  Traditional coping techniques, such as trade, migration, the 
storage of food during productive years, and temporarily laboring for 
someone else, are often unworkable in urban areas where both houses 
and the economic resources necessary to replace them are equally 
flimsy following extreme-weather events.34  Thus, the third policy 
agenda item is to recognize the value of the analyst’s struggle to 
understand such a complex interrelatedness, so as to generate viable 
policy alternatives. 
As in the slums of the United States, the poor and powerless are 
segregated from mainstream markets and the better economic 
opportunities they offer, as well as the decent education and health 
 
31 Id. at 47. 
32 See id. at 42. 
33 See, e.g., ABEYGUNAWARDENA ET AL., supra note 23, at IX–XII. 
34 See id. at 6. 
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care that improve productivity and quality of life over time.35  This 
comparison, however, is relative.  For example, there is currently a 
debate over whether poverty should be measured in developing 
countries as living on two dollars per day or one dollar per day, a 
level of poverty no Westerner can imagine.  Even under conservative 
assumptions regarding trends in population growth, land use, and 
industrial production in developing countries, computer models that 
combine environmental and epidemiological factors predict horrid 
health consequences in a warmer world,36 especially in 
underresourced megacities like the six surveyed here, with partial 
exceptions for Rio and Kuala Lumpur.  The fourth policy agenda 
item, then, is to promote the political and socioeconomic integration 
of the one billion (two billion by 2030) urban poor and powerless at 
the international level, as well as within developing countries.37 
In all of the cities under discussion, the reasons for their original 
formation in a particular location no longer apply.38  This is due to 
what economists call a collective action problem: moving to a 
particular city was and is a rational individual response to changing 
opportunities, even as it creates an overcrowded mess in the 
aggregate.  Various national government efforts to curb this 
urbanization have proved futile because they contradict a private 
economic logic.  A city will rarely depopulate much or disappear after 
a disaster—in the modern, post–Sodom and Gomorrah world—for 
economic reasons.  Corporations and wealthy groups can adjust to 
disaster with relative ease, and the poor who are de facto bound to 
them are stuck and forced to learn to live with the risk of disaster.39  
In the crisis-prone Mumbai slums, for example, young workers often 
eat and sleep near their sewing machines in workhouse fashion, while 
earning four times what they would earn in the rural areas.40  The fifth 
agenda item is calling attention to such collective action problems, 
since they can either reinforce or all but negate policy proposals. 
 
35 Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 
741, 741 (1992). 
36 Sid Perkins, Dead Heat: The Health Consequences of Global Warming Could be 
Many, 166 SCI. NEWS 10, 10 (2004). 
37 See PATRICIA L. MCCARNEY, UN-HABITAT, OUR FUTURE: SUSTAINABLE CITIES—
TURNING IDEAS INTO ACTION 34 (2006), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/ 
downloads/docs/3040_94379_background-final.pdf. 
38 Cf. Huq et al., supra note 5, at 9–12 (discussing why cities develop on risky sites). 
39 Id. at 4; see also SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 94–96. 
40 Poverty in India: A Flourishing Slum, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2007, at 57, 59. 
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High levels of air and water pollution, already endemic in the cities 
under discussion, will exacerbate climate change events for the 
overwhelming majority who cannot afford ameliorations like air 
conditioning or bottled drinking water.  While air breathability varies 
in the six cities being discussed, it is estimated that breathing the air 
in Jakarta, which currently has some fourteen million residents, is the 
health equivalent of smoking two packs of cigarettes a day.41  Since 
many Jakartans also smoke two or more packs of strong but cheap 
kretek clove cigarettes daily, the fight for breath is often audible on 
the streets on a hot day. 
“[D]oubling atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide boost[s] 
ragweed . . . pollen production by [sixty] percent” in the United 
States.42  Developing countries have their own asthma-inducing plants 
and conditions, which are exacerbated in similar ways.  Pollen and 
mold spores easily attach to diesel exhaust, which is then inhaled by 
children, the elderly, and others at risk.43  Such statistics are “‘a real 
wake-up call for people who mistakenly think global warming is only 
going to be a problem way off in the future or that it has no impact on 
their lives in any meaningful way.’”44  Though we have not seen 
relevant studies, asthma is undoubtedly a more serious problem in our 
six (and many other developing) cities compared to those in the 
United States.  Other air pollutants like ground-level ozone and 
airborne particulates are associated with increased numbers of 
emergency room visits, hospital admissions, and deaths from lung 
diseases in the United States.45 
In the poor and powerless neighborhoods of these developing 
cities, the absence of interconnected sewer drains, much less actual 
treatment of the sewage, means that flooding increases water 
pollution that is already potentially deadly, especially since the water 
table is typically quite high.  This is echoed in the findings of the city 
ombudsperson of Buenos Aires, Argentina, after an NGO filed a 
 
41 Cf. LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B 3.0: MOBILIZING TO SAVE CIVILIZATION 192–212 
(2008) (discussing the air quality problems of several large Asian cities). 
42 Perkins, supra note 36, at 12. 
43 Id. 
44 Press Release, Harvard Med. Sch. Ctr. for Health and the Global Env’t, Experts: 
Childhood Asthma “Epidemic” Among Inner-City Youths Seen in Absence of Steps to 
Curb Global Warming, Fossil Fuel Use (Apr. 29, 2004), available at 
http://chge.med.harvard.edu/media/releases/urbanpress.html (quoting senior research 
scientist, Christine Rogers). 
45 Perkins, supra note 36, at 11. 
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complaint against the city government for sewage “discrimination” 
against the poor and powerless who live in the southern districts.46  
Children there, and the elderly to a lesser extent, thus face the risks of 
hepatitis, gastroenteritis, cholera, meningitis, typhoid, and even 
polio.47  The study found that the existing sewage arrangements were 
“incomplete and deficient.”48  They were created by the residents 
themselves, another collective action problem, rather than planned for 
interconnection by the local government; the consortium hired to 
improve things in Buenos Aires did little, and its contract has been 
revoked as a result.49  This tale is typical of infrastructures in the 
developing world because, by definition, the poor and powerless 
cannot help themselves or compel the authorities to help them; 
indeed, if they could, they would not be poor and powerless. 
Cairo and the agricultural productivity of rural Egypt offer a 
contrary example because they are vulnerable to upstream rainfall 
variations, rainfall which is markedly decreasing overall, in Ethiopia 
and South Sudan.50  This rain then flows to Egypt through the Blue 
and White Nile respectively.  Such decreased rainfall, then, 
impoverishes three connected countries.  A similar story can be told 
about the Ganges and Indus rivers flowing through India and many of 
its major cities. 
The availability of cooling centers is limited in developing cities 
because the main venues, such as government offices and elite hotels, 
are unlikely to welcome temporary occupation by poor people.  One 
might wonder whether tax incentives could encourage corporations to 
open their offices to the poor temporarily, but, in these six cities and 
others, most corporations have already bribed their way into paying 
little to no taxes.  A clever NGO, however, might convince a 
multinational corporation of the public relations benefit that would 
 
46 Marcela Valente, Argentina: Open Sewers a Health and Environmental Risk, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 25, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33012. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 C. FUNK ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATING MEHER CROP 
PRODUCTION USING RAINFALL IN THE ‘LONG CYCLE’ REGION OF ETHIOPIA 3 (2003), 
available at http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/adds/pubs/EthProductionOutlook.pdf (noting 
that “the long cycle growing region in Ethiopia has been experiencing a strong and 
consistent drying trend”); SUMAYA AHMED ZAKIELDEEN, ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE: A VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR SUDAN 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/14856IIED.pdf (noting that average rainfall in Sudan 
declined between 1941 and 2000). 
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result from serving as a cooling center.  Otherwise, the poor may feel 
lucky to cool off in badly polluted underground car parks.  Rural 
residents are often out of luck altogether.  The sixth agenda item is 
perhaps obvious: tailor infrastructure projects, including those in 
health and education, to match local conditions and knowledge. 
A major reason why slum housing is overcrowded and of poor 
quality is the fact that, with partial exceptions in Caracas and Kuala 
Lumpur, such housing is ostensibly illegal, and is thus occupied by 
squatters who often connect to electricity lines illegally.  These 
squatters are treated as illegals by local governments, police, and the 
military.  Owners, frequently as landlords, thus have no incentive to 
invest in housing improvements when the municipality could bulldoze 
the housing at any time.  Hernando De Soto has done excellent work 
on the design of private property rights of “identified encroachers” in 
Mumbai, who are guaranteed compensation if their house is 
bulldozed,51 and the design of administrative laws.  The solution, 
basically, is to decrease the number and complexity of bureaucratic 
procedures to reduce their cost and the opportunities for corruption.52  
An audit of existing planning regulations would show the points 
where access to land is most impeded.  The cure is to create a 
measure of security in unauthorized settlements, while also reducing 
the growth of future slums through improved access to land and basic 
services.  There are promising experiments with communal urban 
tenures and, under U.N. Human Settlements Programme (UN-
HABITAT), shared private-public ownership;53 in fact, thirty percent 
of costs concern roads and needed public spaces anyway.54  The 
seventh agenda item is establishing private property and land 
administration rules consistent with the nation’s legal system, 
influenced as it is by colonial experiences and by subsequent ruling 
ideologies, which would increase tenure security and access to land 
and basic services at a price the poor can afford.  Such an improved 
stake likely gives the poor more incentive to participate, and to thus 
reduce their powerlessness. 
Community-based adaptation (CBA) and microplanning within a 
developmental framework, rather than the narrower one offered by, 
 
51 See Poverty in India: A Flourishing Slum, supra note 40, at 59. 
52 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD 246–52 (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row Publishers 1989) (1986). 
53 See MCCARNEY, supra note 37, at 38. 
54 See SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 82 tbl.11. 
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for example, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,55 
are so important that they provide our eighth agenda item.  This is 
because CBAs can, and sometimes actually do, provide not only 
things that poor individuals cannot afford, but that the various levels 
of government, aid donors, and international agencies cannot or will 
not fund.56  The problem is that local NGOs frequently cannot reach 
consensus because, as in the typical law faculty meeting, little or 
nothing is at stake.  However, seed money, or sponsorship by 
international or national NGOs, can often help form a compelling 
consensus.  Human rights and the environment are areas where so-
called civil society has made great strides.  Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace, for example, are international NGOs that offer 
compelling agendas and small amounts of money to their national and 
local affiliates.  International NGOs sometimes deflect criticisms 
from their affiliates, many of which operate underground.  Those 
interested in climate change have yet to organize in this fashion, but 
such a step could be promoted by policy analysts qua analysts.  In the 
many countries where the right to organize is not robust, operating 
underground makes sense because the police and military treat those 
who seem to oppose even local government policies as terrorists, 
currently the favored buzzword, or radicals who must be opposed 
coercively like the illegal residents they are.  The ninth agenda item is 
to give the typically underemployed, yet expensive, police and 
military tasks to perform, such as disaster relief and other useful 
efforts related to climate change.  Uniformed officers and poor people 
getting to know each other in uncoerced ways creates good public 
relations. 
The political and administrative complexities surrounding our topic 
are enormous.  There are similarities at a relatively high level of 
generality: a political and administrative elitism that makes 
participation by, and assistance to, the poor and powerless remote and 
difficult; an imperfect democratic accountability; the difficulty of 
designing political and administrative incentives for elites who, as a 
consequence, frequently turn climate threats into man-made disasters; 
and the tendency to pass the buck to a different level of government 
or to a foreign or multilateral aid donor.  The sensible planning and 
implementation of climate change policies are handicapped by the 
distinct limits on bureaucratic competence, professionalism, and 
 
55 See id. at 62–63. 
56 See id.; Alex de Sherbinin et al., supra note 9, at 61–62. 
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altruism that promote corruption and a public mistrust of bureaucrats 
admittedly pulled in many directions at once.  There are also many 
differences between and among countries rich and poor—differences 
in culture, levels of development, political and bureaucratic styles, 
and laws and legal systems due to different types of colonialism and 
post-independence ideologies and experiences.  What, if anything, 
can be usefully modified and transplanted from richer countries?  Can 
experts from these rich countries or from other poorer countries help 
create effective participation by the poor and powerless, as well as 
planning and implementation strategies?  These are the topics 
analyzed in Part II. 
II 
POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Kwame Nkrumah, the Black Star and first leader of post-colonial 
Ghana, famously said: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all 
things shall be added unto you.”57  Nkrumah was arguably being more 
honest than his counterparts elsewhere, and we will examine the 
domestic political and administrative backdrop to climate change 
from this perspective, sometimes using Chicago’s Mayors Daley, the 
elder and the younger, as our guides.  Author Brietzke worked in 
Jakarta during a period when Suharto and his cronies’ grip on power 
began to loosen.  What transpired was called the “first e-mail 
revolution”: security forces were never able to puzzle out the hit-and-
run tactics of large numbers of students and others that were 
coordinated over the internet and by e-mail.  Jakarta friends and 
colleagues thought Brietzke psychic because he could almost always 
predict the cronies’ short-term responses.  His technique can now be 
revealed: he would think of what Chicago’s former Mayor Daley, the 
elder, would do in like circumstances.  This analogy predicted so well 
because Chicago politics was, and still is, highly centralized in a one-
party state—or municipality, for non-Chicagoans—run through 
patron-client relations, and blended with some democratic aspects.  
These democratic elements serve partly to disarm would-be domestic 
reformers and, in many developing countries, soothe international and 
bilateral donors.58  We see such regimes in many developing 
 
57 KWAME NKRUMAH, GHANA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF KWAME NKRUMAH 164 (4th 
prtg. 1961). 
58 See infra Part II.A. 
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countries; Indonesia’s Sukarno called it “guided democracy,” and its 
hallmark is a political elitism.59 
A.  Politics 
As always, the political complexity of climate change events 
continues to outrun their scientific complexity.  We should not merely 
project elitism onto a Chicago political system known to be 
kleptocratic and patronage-ridden, or project it into some analytically 
safe foreign city.  There are, however, some countervailing powers 
and pressures on elitism in the United States, so that it does not 
always determine political outcomes.  But such powers and pressures 
have yet to emerge in many developing countries. 
The six developing cities under discussion and their respective 
countries have slightly varying degrees and types of democracy while 
sharing the common element of governance through elitism.60  Keen 
to insulate themselves from extreme-weather events, they, like Mayor 
Daley, the younger, will deal with such events only if forced to do so.  
Unfortunately, the poor and powerless by definition lack a politically 
effective way to express their needs and desires, or to organize 
effective NGOs to pursue their needs and desires as they define them, 
rather than relying on some elite politician who purports to represent 
them. 
To have an effective and permanent democracy, it is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition, as the mathematicians say, that the ranks 
of the elites be fragmented.  President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and 
President Hugo Chavez have divided the elites in Brazil and 
Venezuela, respectively, for example, with their populist rhetoric and 
some populist, occasionally undemocratic actions.  Populism is at 
once the antithesis of, and an outgrowth from, elitism.  Consider 
 
59 Paul H. Brietzke, The Politics of Legal Reform, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
1, 4–12, 60 (2004).  “Elitism” is rule by an autonomous and self-perpetuating group, 
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era Louisiana politics under Huey Long, for example.  Id. at 4–5, 11–12. 
60 Id. at 4, 6–9. 
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Peronism in Argentina and Huey Long’s politics in Depression-era 
Louisiana.61  Lula and Chavez may prove responsive to extreme-
weather planning, but, in the other four cities and countries under 
discussion, elitism correlates with an increasing inequality and a 
resistance to reform through business as usual.62  Regardless of 
whether elites are fragmented, the only recourse of the poor and 
powerless is usually to demonstrate or riot—a major reason why 
elites, and their police and military, treat extreme-weather events first 
and foremost as law-and-order problems.  Consider, for example, 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. 
Adaptations to climate changes require long time horizons, while 
political time horizons are short.  This discrepancy makes the design 
of political incentives difficult.63  The Chicago heat wave of 1995 can 
be understood on the basis of political underdevelopment.  An actual 
climate disaster is almost always a necessary precondition to effective 
action in the future, given the many more immediate and serious 
issues that compete for the attention of politicians of limited 
imagination, and the necessarily limited agenda-setting capacity of 
the poor in most developing areas.64  Daley’s initial reluctance to 
innovate stemmed from (self-) satisfaction with the status quo and 
from fears that the necessary changes would diminish his power, 
based as it is on patron-client networks.  Fundamental to change 
under political elitism is the reasonable certainty that the electorate 
will hold incumbent elites responsible, an accountability65 that, in 
turn, requires a vibrant media and a civil society that discovers and 
publicizes the consequences of politicians’ inaction.66  Daley was 
either smarter or less arrogant than other autocratic leaders in Chicago 
and recognized a regime-threatening event when he saw one.  He was 
 
61 Id. at 38; see also ALLAN P. SINDLER, HUEY LONG’S LOUISIANA 16 (1956). 
62 Id. at 9. 
63 Alex de Sherbinin et al., supra note 9, at 61. 
64 See SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at viii–ix, 38–40.  Indeed, handled 
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65 See Brietzke, supra note 59, at 5. 
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eventually seen to act appropriately and spurred the development of a 
heat wave response plan that ultimately proved effective.67 
As with the effects of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, it 
is generally agreed that many massive natural disasters often have 
human folly as their precipitating ingredient.68  Famines, for example, 
often occur following revolutions or government aggression against 
civilian populations, as they did in Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and too 
many more countries in recent decades.  Indeed, since the 1980s, 
Oxfam and other voluntary disaster relief organizations have seen 
famines and malnutrition as man-made disasters, rather than as the 
result of purely natural phenomena.69  The burden of relief falls on 
these organizations and those of the United Nations, enabling the elite 
politicians, who need not fear accountability and subsequent electoral 
loss, to practice what economists call a moral hazard:70 do nothing to 
mitigate or adapt to a climate change disaster before the fact, secure in 
the knowledge that disaster relief agencies will bail out their poor and 
powerless after a fashion.  The same kind of moral hazard applies to 
risky behavior by banks that are “too big to fail,” which expect a 
government bailout when they create disasters, as well as to education 
and health care expenditures in poor countries.  The money saved by 
not incurring such expenses, because international and bilateral 
donors will fill the gaps somehow, leaves elites free to spend on the 
weapons that reinforce their elite power. 
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(forthcoming). 
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B.  Administration 
The accuracy of Kwame Nkrumah’s assertion above71 is borne out 
when we explore a comparative public administration.  In the West, 
effective heat wave response plans, for example, are produced by 
appropriately trained and motivated professionals, some of whom 
belong to advocacy coalitions.72  Such bureaucrats think and behave 
in ways that neoconservative public choice economists do not 
understand and thus cannot explain.  They cannot explain such 
behavior on the basis of the altruistic inner checks associated with a 
bureaucratic professionalism, grounded in a long-term, agency-
socialized view of the public interest—the very existence of which is 
denied by such economists who consider nearly all bureaucratic acts 
as inherently selfish and budget, power, or wealth maximizing.73  
Whichever way the reader comes out on this issue with regard to 
Western administrators, it seems clear that there is very little 
bureaucratic altruism in most developing countries.  Why?  Because 
there is very little of the professionalism through which it can take 
root.  The net effect in these cities and countries is that little will 
happen unless Nkrumah’s political lash is applied liberally, inevitably 
by elites whose motives are usually far removed from responding to 
extreme-weather events. 
Low levels of administrative competence in many developing 
countries, especially at the municipal level, along with a well-
deserved public mistrust due to the few benefits conferred by the 
bureaucracy, in the absence of bribes the poor cannot afford, perhaps, 
would bedevil any serious attempt to implement extreme-climate 
policies.  Migdal finds that complex organizations, including states, 
have a tendency to disintegrate over time because of the various 
forces pulling them in so many directions; it is his contention that 
 
71 See NKRUMAH, supra note 57. 
72 See Susan M. Bernard & Michael A. McGeehin, Municipal Heat Wave Response 
Plans, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1520, 1520 (2004). 
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national cultures can provide stability and continuity to these 
institutions,74 and that this self-regulating mechanism is mostly 
lacking in failed or failing states.  Local administrators and politicians 
in these six cities are typically placed in office by national politicians 
as a reward for services they provided through patron-client networks, 
rather than because of a level of competence determined by 
competitive exams.  Low incomes and meager tax collection 
capacities at the local level generate few local revenues, which are, in 
any event, dissipated through political maneuvers.75  Robin Craig 
makes the important point that regulatory fragmentation, resulting in 
multiple assertions of authority and use-right claims, wastes scarce 
water (and many other resources, we would argue); provokes 
irreconcilable conflicts;76 and, we would add, creates collective action 
problems, namely, ensuring enough for yourself creates waste and 
hoarding, and thus leaves too little for others in the aggregate.  For 
example, as it passes through central Jordan, the once-mighty Jordan 
River flows only six feet wide and two feet deep; countries upstream, 
Syria and Israel, take too much from the river and its underground 
aquifers for irrigation purposes.77  Elites and their special interest 
groups, rather than some politically or administratively defined public 
interest, will likely win such games.78  More neutral and expert 
international determinations are really no solution, and leaving such 
determinations to the economists’ disembodied market makes them 
no less vulnerable to subordination by elites and their special interest 
groups.  Craig’s recommendations of a public debate, one that weighs 
cross-jurisdictional tradeoffs and pays more attention to the “end of 
the line”—for example, the shrinking and otherwise dying Dead Sea, 
into which the River Jordan empties—could be adapted to suit other 
resources as well.79 
Capable planning resources are scarce, stretched, and stressed by 
elites ignoring or bribing their way out of inconvenient strictures that 
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are embodied in some plan.  It is risky to specialize in, for example, 
health care planning, since bureaucrats are regularly transferred for 
reasons unrelated to need or individual performance.  They might be 
transferred to forestall the emergence of rival patron-client networks, 
real or imagined, for example.  Planning is almost certainly a sketchy, 
top-down imposition, where the undifferentiated top has often been 
wrong in the past.  Such planning and regulation as it exists only 
serves those in power, as colonial relics perhaps, and is expensive and 
therefore corruptible.  Emergency responses are uniformly directed 
toward maintaining regime stability, and involve the military and 
police rather than civil servants.  Very low bureaucratic salaries and, 
often, a culture of corruption—the “tradition of gift-giving,” or the 
“way we do things here,” as it is sometimes described—mean that the 
bureaucratic decisions that are ultimately made often run contrary to 
policies based on reasoned elaborations of the public interest.80 
People imbued with professionalism would do almost anything 
except join the dispirited, ill-trained, and poorly paid bureaucracy in 
most developing countries.  Author Brietzke has concluded that rather 
strict, discretion-minimizing administrative laws, with clear criteria 
for evaluating and promoting or demoting the bureaucrat, and her 
evaluator, are what works in most developing countries.81  This is 
simply because few will use their bureaucratic discretion to innovate 
in ways that advance the public interest.  In sum, the frequent absence 
of suitable political and bureaucratic incentives is a significant 
constraint on transplanting useful experiences from elsewhere to deal 
with extreme-climate events in the developing world. 
Explanations are needed for the paucity of climate change studies 
and plans in developing cities and countries.  Is it caused by a lack of 
awareness, or by a lack of interest, given the seemingly more pressing 
developmental needs?  Is it caused by inattention among elites, or 
overstretched scientific and planning capacities?  Is it caused by all of 
these reasons?  What, if anything, should be transplanted from 
Western countries, if it could be transplanted?  For example, after the 
2003 heat waves in Europe, the European Ministries of Health and 
Environment, at the Fourth Ministerial Conference for Environment 
and Health in Budapest in 2004, recognized the increasing hazards 
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posed to human health by global warming.  It was thus decided that it 
would: 
[(1)] develop[] . . . guidelines for estimating the burden of disease 
due to weather . . . ; [(2)] develop indicators for intercountry and 
intracountry comparison and monitoring of progress; [(3)] . . . 
coordinate the development of new methods, including sentinel 
monitoring and surveillance systems, to provide timely information 
on the health impacts of weather and climate extremes at the 
European level; [and] . . . develop and evaluate more effective and 
efficient interventions, such as early warning systems . . . ; and . . . 
[(4)] harmonize interventions across regions and countries to 
facilitate the sharing of data and lessons learnt.82 
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended and then 
participated in this harmonization.  For Europeans, “[i]t is the 
combination of sciences, skills, and beliefs that is directed to the 
maintenance and improvement of the health of all the people through 
collective or social actions.”83 
Could this kind of approach be transplanted into the six cities being 
surveyed?  Arguably, yes, into Caracas, Rio, and Jakarta, where 
ideological leanings coincide with a colonial background and legal 
system influences of the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch respectively.  
But the European emphasis on uniformity assumes this is both 
possible and desirable.  This kind of collective social action is very 
un-British, especially after Blair’s so-called reform of the Labour 
Party, and incompatible with the subsequent laws and ideological 
orientations evident in Nairobi, Kuala Lumpur, and Cairo.  While 
Islam might be thought of as supportive of such an approach, it is 
merely given lip service in Egypt and Malaysia, and does not form 
much of the political formula in either country.  More important, 
should this approach be transplanted?  Europeans often punt issues 
like climate change to the European Union, a step typically thought 
inappropriate by the British, to say nothing of ostensibly 
individualistic Americans.  Jurisdiction over climate change disasters 
in the United States usually falls to local governments by default 
because state and federal governments try to duck responsibility, 
despite the fact that climate change occurs in “interstate commerce,” 
the major constitutional source of unenumerated federal powers in the 
United States.  Consider, for example, the chaos surrounding the 
responses to Hurricane Katrina.  Accountability here, discharging 
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responsibility in visibly effective ways, is as vital to achieving 
administrative goals as it is in politics.  In the Chicago example, the 
public and the media fixed responsibility on the office of the Mayor.84  
In Europe, responsibility is fixed on a national ministry or even on the 
national chief executive; the European Union lacks reality for many 
Europeans and their media.  It makes sense to apply a European 
approach to accountability in the six cities discussed here, where local 
politicians and administrators are seen as incompetent time-servers, 
lacking an independent power base like that of Chicago’s Mayors 
Daley.  It remains to be seen whether bilateral aid donors or 
international agencies can perform EU-like functions for these six 
cities.85 
Some functions, like weather prediction, are easy to integrate.  The 
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has 
global satellite and computer modeling coverage far superior to its 
European counterpart.  NOAA gives about two weeks warning 
compared to three to seven days for European systems,86 to say 
nothing of the World Meteorological Organization’s system.  NOAA 
already has a significant number of subscriber countries, funded by 
small sums from Congress to deliver the kinds of models and 
information that local experts need.87  Some, Venezuela’s Chavez for 
example, might mistrust NOAA’s information, which is admittedly 
cleansed of sensitive national security information before being 
shared, but other users find it reliable.  There is a great deal of 
research on risk assessment, which is the implications of vulnerability 
to the event rather than the potential seriousness of the event itself; 
rapid detection;88 the costs and effects of house design; the means of 
organizing churches, synagogues, mosques, and other community 
organizations for local observations and disaster relief; and otherwise 
fixing many other gaps in our knowledge.89 
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Such information can be, and to a large extent already is, shared 
with the developing world.  Financial adaptations and innovations are 
also important.  Cheap credit for small sums can be used to upgrade 
housing, to reduce both its impact on climate change and its 
vulnerability to weather events; create modest infrastructures; or start 
a business.  An attenuation of risk, and a more accurate pricing of it, 
could result through a widespread and affordable, privately or 
publicly underwritten insurance, which spreads risk without creating 
moral hazards.90  The World Bank is experimenting with underwriting 
such insurance.91  But the problem remains that overlapping 
international, national, and local structures will spawn incoherent and 
uncoordinated funding systems that are damaging to the continuity 
that longer-term projects require.  Private sector investment and 
private-public or NGO-public partnerships all have their welcome 
place, but, like insurance, their potential role has long been 
overestimated.  In these and many other areas, local participation can 
be used to get the projects right, and to reduce their cost.92 
What should administrators or politicians do about climate change 
in developing countries?  Experiences in the United States provide a 
long list for developing countries to ponder concerning the relevance 
of topics and the workability of local adaptations.  These include 
creating warning systems around weather predictions;93 effective 
education and communication, for and with various publics and by 
various means; public registries of the elderly and other at-risk groups 
who need special attention during a disaster; experimenting with 
higher-tech solutions, such as a network of remote sensors that are 
particularly valuable for monitoring heat and earthquake events; 
public health measures, as executed by agencies that are underfunded 
and overstretched in all countries; identifying how medical practices 
and emergency systems for people who fall ill from extreme weather 
events differ from ordinary practices and systems; disaster response, 
perhaps by training the police and military, which would build the 
more positive image discussed above,94 and create a more expert 
urban and regional planning structure that will generate public 
benefits beyond responses to climate change; awareness of cultural, 
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behavioral, and sociological factors that can make relief easier or 
more difficult; determining which additional resources are needed and 
where these can be obtained or perhaps borrowed; and how greater 
accountability, for example, will make politicians more deserving of 
local political, NGO, and media support over time. 
European efforts, on the other hand, tend to be broader and more 
integrated.  Contrasts with shorter-term, municipal-level plans of the 
United States are striking: changes in European building codes and 
wetland and shoreline protections; other land use provisions and 
planning permissions; controls over the rates of urbanization and 
deforestation; curbing air and water pollution by certain industries 
located close to cities; and other longer-term, risk-reducing concerns.  
These matters are all regulated to some extent in the United States, 
but Europeans will try to link these factors more coherently with 
concerns about climate change.  Still, disasters like extreme-heat 
events are so new in Europe that the tailoring of responses to a 
specific event leaves much to be desired, including: the tailoring of 
local care and outreach; the communication of information to various 
publics; providing some basic responses, such as ice or untainted 
water and food; and the air conditioning of hospitals, cooling centers, 
and other facilities where at-risk people congregate.  But developing 
countries are lucky in that they can select among what they may see 
as adaptable U.S. and European approaches to help develop a 
coherent package for meeting local needs.  In the end, administrative 
success turns on local accountability,95 capacity, and competence.96 
III 
DONORS AND POTENTIAL GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 
It is too easy to paint ourselves into a gloomy policy corner.  As is 
the case with Chicago and the French, underdevelopment problems in 
the politics, administration, and scientific capacities of most 
developing countries—and certainly in the six cities being surveyed, 
as well as elsewhere in the West—show how problematic the 
political-planning-implementation-enforcement interface can be for 
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dealing with climate change.97  Can bilateral donors and U.N. 
agencies remedy these weaknesses? 
Cairo, Egypt; Nairobi, Kenya; and Jakarta, Indonesia, are acutely 
dependent on aid from multilateral and bilateral donors.  Without this 
aid, it is unlikely that their unstable governments would remain in 
power, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) could 
thus demand implementation of effective climate change policies as 
one among many conditions on their receiving regime-saving aid.  
But this is unlikely to happen because donor funds are small 
compared to developing country needs, and the donors are, at present, 
unlikely to even consider extreme weather.98  The hope is that 
“logical, justifiable, fundable” climate change projects “driven by 
good science” will get funded,99 but this hope usually recedes into the 
future.  Composed of elites at the upper reaches, the donors only 
know how to deal with fellow elites living in developing cities and 
countries.100  These people are unlikely to consider extreme-weather 
events because they offer little profit and can often be ameliorated for 
wealthy families by, for example, allowing them to vacation in Paris 
during such an event.  Consider the World Bank’s passion for huge 
dam projects, which provide cheap power for large corporations, but 
misery and eviction from their dam-flooded lands for the rural poor, 
thereby swelling the ranks of the urban poor.  Perhaps it was the late 
John Kenneth Galbraith that called a fondness for such things as dams 
an edifice complex.  Even if aid donors mandated good climate 
change policies, their unwillingness to monitor the subsequent 
implementation of these mandates leaves the countries and cities in 
question free to do little more than give lip service to such policies 
and appoint several bureaucrats who will busily do nothing to 
implement the mandate.101 
Funds are more likely to be available for disaster relief than for 
alleviating the effects of climate change.  People and governments are 
moved to contribute to relief NGOs and U.N. agencies by media 
 
97 See generally Paul H. Brietzke, Playing Poker at the U.N., 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 317 (2007); Paul H. Brietzke, Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, 17 FLA. 
J. INT’L L. 633 (2005) (critiquing the modern international legal arena). 
98 But see ABEYGUNAWARDENA ET AL., supra note 23, at 22–23. 
99 SATTERTHWAITE ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
100 See id. at 3, 43. 
101 Brietzke, supra note 59, at 13–19. 
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depictions of manifest suffering; consider, for example, Haiti in early 
2010.  Even so, and admitting how awful climate change disasters are 
for the participants, U.N. and charitable donations are often grossly 
inadequate, and seldom meet the needs of the poor and powerless who 
are most affected.  After the December 2004 tsunami in South Asia, 
though not a climate change-related disaster, the Red Cross 
distributed thick blankets in Sri Lanka, a place far too warm to need 
them.102  Relatively abundant disaster relief funds are being used in 
Sri Lanka to build “world-class tourist centers,” rather than to resettle 
the half million displaced people or rebuild the two hundred schools 
and four universities that were destroyed.103  Can we imagine a 
regional, or better yet, global equivalent of the new tsunami warning 
system, which failed South Java, Indonesia, in July 2006, for extreme-
weather events generally, along with more effective and customized 
planning for each city?  Further, can we imagine such a system 
without the climate change equivalent of the 2004 tsunami having to 
occur before meaningful global action begins?  How would resources 
be provided for such systems? 
According to Huq et al., “[t]here is a profound unfairness globally 
between those who cause climate change and those who are most at 
risk from its effects,” through CO2 emissions and the high 
consumption lifestyles of wealthy people and nations.104  High-
income nations maintain their own greenhouse gas and other harmful 
emissions by importing many energy-intensive goods from, for 
example, China, which has now replaced the United States as the 
world’s largest polluter of greenhouse gases.105  After all, analyses of 
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NEWS, Apr. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4874224.stm.  One much-
touted reform that is no reform at all is the United States “saving” 1711 million tons of 
carbon dioxide by importing goods from China—something Americans were going to do 
anyway, given cheaper Chinese prices.  These American imports accounted for fourteen 
percent of China’s carbon dioxide emissions, a savings in the United States of only three  
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sustainable development tend to stress equity in the distribution of 
resources.  Such equity is going global to incorporate climate change 
factors as well.106  These facts and arguments have led many to call 
for a distributive, or, as some have called it, corrective, justice: 
wealthy polluting countries should pay for amelioration of the climate 
change effects they have caused in more lightly polluting developing 
countries, which include the six cities surveyed here.107  It takes little 
imagination to understand why wealthy countries contribute so little 
money to U.N. climate change programs under a “not until China, 
India, and Brazil do” refrain, since they believe that funding from 
such countries is unlikely.  Doyle describes an excellent but very 
different approach from ours; it could be consulted as an antidote, 
perhaps.108 
This Article treats significant parts of what UN-HABITAT’s head, 
Anna Tibaijuka, calls “the biggest problem confronting humanity in 
the [twenty-first] century.”109  According to the background paper for 
the Third World Urban Forum (WUF), the “very existence [of cities] 
is threatened by . . . climate change,” a prospect meriting 
interventions from the very highest to the lowest levels.110  The WUF 
recommends that cities form a new web of relations and partnerships 
with and among multilateral institutions, bilateral donors, national and 
state or provincial governments, the private sector, and the urban 
poor.111  Such relations could help realize upfront resource 
commitments for plan preparation and implementation, and for the 
upgrading of slums, which is part of the WUF’s broader Cities 
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Without Slums campaign.112  This is good global policy advice 
because, as the Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005–2015 notes: 
 Disaster loss is on the rise with grave consequences for the 
survival, dignity and livelihood of individuals, particularly the poor, 
. . . [since this loss interacts with] changing demographic, 
technological and socio-economic conditions, unplanned 
urbanization, . . . environmental degradation, climate variability, 
climate change, . . . competition for scarce resources, and the impact 
of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS . . . . 
 . . . . 
 Events of hydrometeorological origin constitute the large 
majority of disasters. 
 . . . . 
 [T]he Yokohama Strategy [of 1994 addressed] . . . disaster risks 
in the context of sustainable development . . . [and identified gaps 
and challenges that still remain unfilled and unmet] in the following 
five main areas: (a) Governance: organizational, legal and policy 
frame-works; (b) Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and 
early warning; (c) Knowledge management and education; (d) 
Reducing underlying risk factors; (e) Preparedness for effective 
response and recovery.113 
These are the kinds of weaknesses and shortcomings identified in this 
Article, and we see them replicated at the international level, usually 
for different reasons. 
This Article has so far identified many best practices, as well as 
some of the ways in which these can be adapted to become more 
palatable and thus more effective in developing countries.  There are 
many ways in which the integration and implementation of these 
practices are stymied: failures of imagination; political inattention; 
and falling between overly rigid layers of government, planning, and 
administrative incompetence.  Yet, after some eighteen years since 
international efforts began, they have not gotten much further than 
identifying many best practices, including a few we neglect, by a 
bewildering variety114 of international agencies and NGOs that are 
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sometimes preoccupied with reinventing the wheel.115  Each of the 
authors has differing expertise in overcoming coordination and 
integration problems within and among complex organizations, but 
we have not yet obtained enough information to make concrete 
recommendations at the international level, a good future topic. 
While international efforts properly seek to integrate disaster plans 
into overall development efforts, they then ignore these plans, perhaps 
in order to build political coalitions.  A basic chicken-and-egg 
dilemma emerges: climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts 
are more similar than is often realized, and both are stymied by 
various political and administrative underdevelopments that exist, by 
definition, in the developing world.  The Hyogo Framework calls for 
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enhancing “governance for disaster risk reduction . . . and for 
capacity-development measures,” through, for example, a strong 
institutional basis for implementation.116  The Hyogo Framework 
ignores the fact that only a modestly improved disaster governance 
can occur independent of improved governance in general.  Also, and 
again, presumably for political reasons, international efforts typically 
ignore the need for collaboration among foreign and domestic experts, 
perhaps within international and local NGOs.  Such a need is ignored 
precisely because such collaborations can circumvent or help change 
conventional national politics and, to a lesser extent, national 
administration—factors we identify as significant stumbling blocks. 
Why do international agencies do so little to help poor city 
dwellers in their struggle against climate change?  According to 
Dreher and Ramada-Sarasola, many of these agencies are part of the 
problem rather than the solution.117  The World Trade Organization 
indirectly, and projects financed by the IMF, World Bank, the African 
and Asian Development Banks, and the U.N. Development 
Programme, increase carbon dioxide emissions; projects of the U.N. 
Environmental Program and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development are emissions-neutral; and only Inter-American 
Development Bank projects decrease emissions on balance.118  David 
Satterthwaite identifies four reasons for this state of affairs.119  First, 
international agencies are in “antagonistic relationship[s] between . . . 
[the] low-income groups” regarded as inessential and as holding back 
progress presumably defined in terms of growth rather than 
development.120  Second, and given a tendency to exaggerate the 
relative problems of rural people in developing countries, carbon 
reduction initiatives are “deliberately” ignored.121  Third, the links 
between the disaster and development departments of an international 
agency, and links among agencies, are weak.122  Each department or 
agency has its own programs, criteria, and project cycles, and each 
prefers simple, discrete projects ill-suited for dealing with climate 
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change.123  Fourth, international agencies work through national 
governments, while climate change solutions are often fundamentally 
local.124 
If formal international agencies are of little help, what about 
international NGOs?  As we discussed, they have yet to form over 
climate change, but there is at least one nascent possibility: a loose 
advocacy coalition formed in the United States to lobby and share 
expertise with regard to extreme heat events.  With members of the 
Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction and experts from Europe, 
international organizations, and developing countries, the coalition’s 
members could serve as secular climate change missionaries.  As 
economist Jeffrey Sachs asks: “The question is, do you sit back and 
watch [climate change] as a tragic spectator sport or do you roll up 
your sleeves and try to do [something] about it?”125  A rather loose 
structure could and should be retained, but modest funding from a 
source that would not compromise the group’s independence is 
required.  Expertise in a variety of local cultures and languages, as 
well as in educational and media matters, with special reference to 
how the mistrust common among the poor can be overcome, would 
also be needed.  Overall, this is an expertise of comparisons and 
contrasts, since one-size-fits-all policies will not work. 
With a legitimacy based on not-for-profit voluntarism, advocates 
could initially try to deal with interested municipalities and NGOs.  
To begin with, advocates could target local chapters of the Red 
Cross/Crescent/Flame, and other first responders to disasters, as well 
as organizations of the elderly and medical professionals.  In its 
democracy-through-civil-society efforts, the USAID tries to create or 
strengthen many NGOs.  The Agency’s track record with purpose-
built NGOs is quite poor, however, with funds too often winding up 
in the pockets of elites who try to use their NGO as a political power 
base.  The better course is for advocates to extensively publicize 
climate change preparedness and hope that supportive NGOs will 
then grow or organize themselves. 
While advocates should not rudely neglect national governments, 
conveying a willingness to proceed regardless of national patronage, 
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and to seek funding directly for municipalities from an international 
organization, might enhance opportunities for useful collaborations at 
the national level.  At the very least, national politicians could 
increase the incomes and status of bureaucrats in climate change-
related fields, and markedly reduce the rate of their transfer to other 
departments to give their group expertise a chance to grow. 
While altruism has its limitations among a city’s residents, the 
probability that one’s family will lose life, health, residence, or 
livelihood due to a climate change event should create quite an 
effective negative incentive.  But studies show that many people 
discount similar probabilities too heavily, and that, in any event, 
positive incentives are more effective.  Chief among these is the 
opportunity for participation in the planning and implementation of 
climate change mitigations and adaptations.126  Elite politicians might 
oppose this, thinking that it will lead to demands for public 
participation in other areas as well, or result in the loss of politicians’ 
moral hazard opportunities to do nothing because international 
organizations will bail citizens out after a fashion if disaster strikes. 
Empowerment through participation is a powerful incentive, which 
can lead to the growth of a valuable “culture of disaster resilience.”127  
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, on the other hand, 
speaks of “a true culture of prevention”128 taking root, adapted to local 
contexts and stressing cooperation and coordination.  Such cultures 
rely on education, beginning in primary school, as “an interactive 
process of mutual learning among people and institutions.”129  For 
example, lessons are learned locally and from other countries 
concerning “the sustainable use and management of ecosystems.”130  
While on the subject of incentives, it is just as important to determine 
what motivates cooperation within, between, and among the varied 
agencies at international, national, and local levels, and different 
ethnic and religious groups at the local level.  There is some research 
that can be carefully adapted to be made more culturally relevant: the 
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effects of information on participants and on their problem-solving,131 
consensus building and using it for planning purposes,132 local 
knowledge and the discussion process,133 and dealing with ethnic or 
religious dissensus.134 
Food security prior to the disaster, the subsequent availability of 
emergency funds, and the means of forestalling epidemics and 
criminal activity after the fact, are fundamental to ensuring resilience, 
as is the protection and the strengthening of infrastructures discussed 
earlier.  The Hyogo Framework also calls for strengthening social 
safety nets,135 ignoring the fact that these have been dismantled in 
many developing countries because of conditions previously attached 
to loans from the IMF and the World Bank.  Also, the diversification 
of income-earning opportunities to decrease the disaster vulnerability 
of the poor, recommended in Hyogo,136 is useful in theory but 
unrealistic: the poor are lucky to find one such opportunity, which can 
then be wiped out by a disaster like the fishermen who lost their boats 
and fishing grounds because of the December 2004 tsunami.  But 
funds spent duplicating income opportunities can better be used to 
create primary opportunities for those who do not yet have them. 
Above all, much of the otherwise-valuable disaster planning done 
by international organizations only amounts to wish lists because they 
do not describe where and how the resources necessary for policy 
implementation are to be found.  Perhaps to atone for past policy 
mistakes, and like the G8 at its 2005 Gleneagles Summit, the World 
Bank seems to have both the inclination and the money to deal with 
climate change and disasters in a developmental context.137  
Unfortunately, however, the climate change issue evaporated from the 
2006 G8 Summit.  The World Bank is trustee and an implementing 
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agency for the Global Environmental Facility established in 1991, 
which is the financial mechanism for administering the U.N. 
Framework Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC).138  The World 
Bank may thus be able to coordinate and integrate some or many 
efforts at various levels through the power of its purse.  Fortunately, 
the departure of Paul Wolfowitz has reduced World Bank ructions.  
Inevitably, money will be sought where it can be found, and other 
international organizations will fund different aspects of the problem, 
thereby dissipating the policy coordination and integration 
accordingly.  This will perhaps include an IMF in desperate search of 
a new role, at least prior to the Great Recession of 2008–10, with the 
experience of coordinating its efforts with those of the World Bank.  
Two favored World Bank projects are described below. 
We sometimes forget that the rather unsuccessful 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol,139 which President Clinton weakened and President Bush 
tried to destroy, was appended to the UNFCCC that took effect in 
1994.140  This Protocol does not cover rapidly industrializing 
countries like China, India, Brazil, and Mexico; the rather optimistic 
hope at the time was that such countries would learn from Western 
experiences and develop in more sustainable ways.141  It would be an 
exaggeration, but not by much, to say that except for bits and pieces, 
the UNFCCC, secretariat and all, disappeared without a trace.  Its 
application is supposed to be coordinated with the Biological 
Diversity, Combating Desertification, and Telecommunications for 
Disaster Relief Conventions that are only slightly more prominent in 
their effects.142  While the UNFCCC is broad enough to accommodate 
improved global policies and coordination, steps in that direction in 
Bali in late 2007 were not promising. 
One of the World Bank’s most favored projects, a strategy referred 
to above that is also recommended in the Hyogo Framework of 2005, 
is insurance against the effects of disaster, inevitably laid off on the 
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reinsurance market to free resources for other uses.  The first such 
experiment in disaster insurance is already in place for Ethiopia 
against the effects of drought.  On the other hand, Haiti was insured 
against hurricanes only to be struck by earthquakes.  Nevertheless, 
globally visible economist Jeffrey Sachs recommends disaster 
insurance as an alternative to the overstretched U.N. World Food 
Program for flooding and mudslides in Guatemala, for example.143  
Sachs said: “This should be an insurable risk, but whether or not the 
premiums would be too high would have to be explored.  It may have 
to be done with some co-financing from the World Bank.”144  Indeed, 
the insurance commissioners of the fifty U.S. states voted 
unanimously to establish a task force to consider the effects of climate 
change on the industry; the world’s largest insurance broker, Marsh & 
McLennan, is advising its Fortune 500 clients on the same subject.145  
Discussing which premiums to charge and who can or must pay them, 
recognizing that the Ethiopian or Guatemalan governments, much less 
their peasants, are too poor to do so, arguably creates too much 
cooperative activity on both sides of the insurance market.  The likely 
effect would be to manipulate premiums into a two-tier, sovereign 
and international organization versus corporate insurance market. 
We could respond to Sachs by saying that all risks are insurable, 
including the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, although 
the U.S. government chose to bail out the affected U.S. insurance 
companies, thereby creating a moral hazard for the companies over 
insurance for megarisks in the future.  The conventional solution is 
for a reinsurer, Lloyds of London or Munich Re for example, to set a 
reinsurance premium on a particular risk, which insurers then use to 
calculate their own premiums.  If the World Bank is known to be 
paying much or all of the premium, our old friend moral hazard re-
enters the equation.  It might, therefore, be more efficient and 
effective for the World Bank simply to self insure; that is, to cut out 
the insurance company middleman and simply pay the cost of 
disasters itself, rather than get beaten to death by insurance premiums 
set by uncompetitive means.  There might also be a useful role for the 
IMF in such a scenario since the conditions it sets on subsidizing 
 
143 Rosenberg, supra note 125. 
144 Id. 
145 Jim Lobe, States Calculate Global Warming Pricetag, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 
14, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32500. 
 2010] Climate Change in Cities of the Developing World 119 
monetary disasters are no longer much observed after Argentina 
called what turned out to be the IMF’s bluff. 
Another favored World Bank project, and the second strategy 
referred to above, is to underwrite carbon dioxide emissions markets 
like Europe’s, as stipulated in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.146  
The idea is that relatively nonpolluting companies or countries can 
sell pollution credits (i.e., the right to pollute) to relatively polluting 
companies or countries at a market price.  This is supposed to 
encourage the adoption of pollution abatement technologies, so as to 
sell more pollution credits or the need to buy fewer of them.  The 
nonmarket alternative, to simply order pollution abatement, is not 
favored by conservative politicians and economists. 
However, the relevant market is fragile and fickle.  The European 
market is driven by an EU rule whereby each of twelve thousand 
firms, which are big users of fossil fuels, will have to pay a carbon tax 
of $50 per ton beginning in 2006 and $125 per ton beginning in 2008, 
to the extent that companies do not meet the targets set by the 
European Union.  The so-called free-market price under the shadow 
of this tax stood at $25.80 per ton of carbon dioxide at the beginning 
of 2006, and rose to $37.75 by mid-April.147  Then came the 
announcement from several European governments that carbon 
dioxide levels were lower than each government’s quota level, and 
the market price quickly fell to $16.60 per ton.148  Rational, cost-
based investments in pollution abatement technology—investments 
that would allow an owner to sell pollution credits or buy fewer of 
them, which is the purpose of the whole scheme—cannot occur in 
such a volatile market.  Germany, one of the biggest EU carbon 
dioxide emitters, decided, pending a challenge in the European 
Commission, to exclude its coal industry from its carbon-trading 
program.149  If this decision sticks, it likely spells the end of the 
European emissions market.  This market can otherwise be seen as an 
expensive flop: Kyoto leads to high carbon prices and a highly 
 
146 ABEYGUNAWARDENA ET AL., supra note 23; see Jad Mouawad, As Profits Surge, 
Oil Giants Find Hurdles Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2006, at A1. 
147 Pollution Reports Hurt CO2 Emissions Market, WASH. TIMES, May 2, 2006, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/02/20060502-122647-8250r/. 
148 Id. 
149 Judy Dempsey, New German Rule Could Increase Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2006, at C6. 
 120 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 85 
differentiated, and thus inefficient, allocation of emissions 
abatements.150 
The United States is not a member of the Kyoto club and, as the 
largest emitter until recently,151 its corporations do not participate in 
such a market.  The European Union prohibits participation in this 
market by non-EU members, and in fact prohibits EU members from 
participating in any non-EU carbon market,152 both of which are 
inefficient restraints of trade.  The United States plans to institute its 
own EU-style carbon tax to perhaps fund environmental or disaster 
remediation.  This seems unlikely given the Great Recession and 
political deadlock, California’s plans notwithstanding, at least until 
after the 2012 elections.  Partly as a result of U.S. government 
inattention, a study shows that European and some Asian companies 
are paying more attention to global warming than their American 
counterparts, and that chemical companies are paying more attention 
overall than are oil companies; Chevron and Texaco are partial 
American exceptions.153  With respect to carbon emissions in the 
United States, DuPont did the best while United Airlines did the 
worst, and some investor groups say they will give effect to this 
study.154 
IV 
THE END AS THE BEGINNING 
The pessimism voiced by Robert Samuelson and James Fleming, 
and discussed in the first paragraph of this Article, may prove 
warranted.  A committee of the IPCC adds to this pessimism its “high 
confidence” that, by 2100, climate change will produce “significant 
impacts” despite “aggressive mitigation . . . [and] significantly 
enhanced adaptive capacity.”155  But our journey through the politics, 
administration, and economics of cities, countries, and regional and 
international organizations in their dealings with extreme-weather 
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events and climate change generates many useful insights that are 
arguably conducive to forming a guarded optimism.  We wish we 
could offer simple resolutions tying up the many loose ends that 
remain, but this topic is as complex as it is essential to solve.  Any 
such solving will likely be done in bits and pieces that are tied to an 
overall development scheme at various governmental levels both 
domestic and international.  We have carried the discourse over 
climate change some way forward, but the global poor command that 
we and our readers persist. 
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